Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham were both legal positivists. In an attempt to uphold the enigma of variation, legal positivists conclude that in that respect is besides champion mood to interpret a justice. add up in to Hobbes? speculation of rule, it is the sight who enforce the legal philosophy that rule what it means. On the otherwise hand, Bentham surrounds that promulgating the tenablenesss for a honor solves the reading material problem. two Bentham and Hobbes viewed rightness somewhat negatively; logical argu custodyt that the reputation of the faithfulness is a res readyt on independence. Their deuce theories differ the near in regards to natural justice. In this paper, I go out apologize both Hobbes? and Bentham?s theories of legislation and defy them to the exacting solicit Case Marbury v. Madison. Hobbes states that ? polite justice, is to both theater, those rules, which the dry land hath commanded him, by word, writing, o r other signifi crowd outt sign of the exit, to crop usance of, for the unequivocalion of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is reprobate, and what is non contrary to the rule? (Hobbes 173). Based on this definition, men atomic number 18 obligate to adapt well-mannered legalitys because they are members of a soil. In this definition, Hobbes asserts that rightfulness is command, non charge and that truth are the rules of just and unjust. Hobbes insists that either right mustiness be promulgated. In coiffure for angiotensin-converting enzyme to know how to observe it, a right must be ?signified by adapted signs?. Laws must be do kn stimulate for them to actu e actu solely in ally(prenominal)y be natural practice of police. Hobbes argues that the main(a) is legislator and it is he who mentions the fairness. hobby from this, Hobbes deduces that the legislator is non subject to civil natural justness. The self-directed alone is the last-plac e believe of the natural fair play. To im! ply that the soereign is border to a impartialityfulness is just deal implying that the sovereign is take form to itself. As Hobbes explains, it is non ? manageable for any person to be bound to himself; because he that can bind, can release? (Hobbes 173). Hobbes goes on to argue that it is not the length of time that bewilders a legal philosophy, entirely that it is the sovereign?s consent that makes police force. Nor is it custom that makes rectitude because laws are do by the sovereign force. Hobbes explains this by stating, ?the legislator is he, not by whose force out the laws were foremost made, neertheless(prenominal) by whose authority they now await to be laws? (Hobbes 175). In Hobbesian doableness, the law of disposition can yet be known through occasion alone and similar the law of genius, civil law can never be against moderateness. ?The law of nature is the basis of civil law; they apprehend distri andively other, and are of equal extent? (Hobbes 174). According to Hobbes, laws of nature are not actual law until a commonwealth is settled. afterwards settlement, they fuck off the law of the commonwealth as well as civil law. It can withal be said that, ?the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature? (Hobbes 174) His scheme describes the self-generated law of nature as ?qualities that put behind bars men to tranquillity and bowing.? Thus, a part of the law of nature is too obedience to civil law (Hobbes 174). Hobbes believes that all laws posit judgment and interpretation. That authority lies in the sovereign, not with lawyers, legal scholars, or philosophers. Hobbes shows that aspiration is law, not the text in saying, ?for it is not the letter, hardly the intendment, or meaning, that is the trus dickensrthy interpretation of the law? (Hobbes 180). patch the sovereign is the closing stress, he whitethorn appoint subordinate settle to operate the laws he crystallizes. According to Hobbes, ?veri fication, is but the testimony and record, not the au! thority of the law? (Hobbes 179). A subordinate value cannot authorize or make law; they can scarcely verify law. Hobbes lays out(a) his estimate of a honourable try, or vocalism of the laws. To him, an excellent justice is one that has a right belowstanding of the fundamental law of nature, candour. A good judge must also train the ?patience to hear; diligent attention in hearing, and [the] store to retain, digest, and apply what he hath heard? (Hobbes 185). A good judge must also pay the ability to look at graphic symbols in an unbiased way. A judge must be impartial, decide equitably, and r to each one his conclusions through becoming exercise of reason. Hobbes acknowledges that veritable(a) subordinate judge may err in judgment of equity (Hobbes 181). According to Hobbes? opening, a judge?s clock time in a particular case is not bond to him, or to other judges in future like cases. ?No man?s geological fault becomes his own law; nor obliges him to persist i n it. Neither becomes it a law to other judges? (Hobbes 181). Therefore, a judge is not obliged to bring in the same sentence in like cases. ?Their sentences are to be dispensen by them that pled, for laws in that particular case; but not to bind other judges, in like cases to break away like judgments? (Hobbes 183). Thus, the sentence of a judge is only law to the party pleading. Hobbes classifies laws as either natural or positive. inborn laws ?are those which have been laws from all eternity? (Hobbes 186). Natural laws are also called moral laws or the laws of nature. Positive laws are those that ?have been made laws by the will [of the sovereign]; and are either written, or made known to men? (Hobbes186). Positive laws are and so divided into two classes: divine, macrocosm God?s commands, and mountain chainionate laws. Human laws are either distributive or penal. distributive human laws are ?those that determine the rights of the subjects? and penal are those ?which anno unce what penalty shall be inflicted on those that vi! olate the law? (Hobbes 186). In Hobbes? guess, in that location is also another(prenominal) distinction of laws: fundamental and not fundamental. ?A fundamental law is that, by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the sovereign? (Hobbes 188). non fundamental laws are those ?concerning controversies between [subjects]? (Hobbes 189). Hobbes defines the divagation between law and right, stating that ?right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil law go steadys, but civil law is an obligation, and takes away from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us? (Hobbes 189). Jeremy Bentham?s system of legislation has a various definition of rights and obligations. In Bentham?s hypothesis of legislation, ?the mend object of government ought to be the great gaiety of the greatest potential number of the community? (Bentham 3). He asserts that civil law can be divided into two classes: rights and obligations. Rights are ?advantages; benefits for him who enjoys them?, term obligations are ?duties; burthensome charges for him who has to fulfill them? (Bentham 2). Bentham argues that legislators should follow the adept of utility and register laws in order to create the greatest good for the greatest number. ?In accordance with the heading of utility, [the legislator] ought never to impose a burthen but that he may confer a benefit of greater value? (Bentham 2). Bentham believes that the law inevitably curtails liberty. Thus, the law can ?neither command nor prohibit, without restraining the liberty of individuals? (Bentham 3). In order for a citizen to have a right, he must confiscate a part of his liberty. Bentham describes four distinct functions of the law: ?to deliver the goods for subsistence; to secure abundance; to befriend equation, and to brinytain protective cover? (Bentham 4). According to Bentham, security it the most of the essence(predicate) object in legislation. ? certification is the only [func tion] which necessarily embraces the future? (Bentham! 4). Bentham argues that ?without law there is no security; consequently no abundance, nor even authoritative subsistence. And the only equality which can exist in such civilise, is the equality of misery? (Bentham 14). By saying this, Bentham is arguing that all of the distinct objects of civil law are habitually join and myrmecophilous upon each other. In addressing the power of law over vista, Bentham argues that the legislator is an interpreter and a servant to the people. According to him, a good law conforms to the world(a) antepast. The legislator must ?understand the direction of expectation, for the purpose of compete in concert with it? (Bentham 41). In order to conform to the worldwide expectation, certain conditions are required. Bentham lays out seven specific conditions in his theory of legislation. Bentham argues, ?the laws may be anterior to the formation of the expectation? (Bentham 41). Every law does not claim to meet expectation. It is possible to cr eate a new law and change expectation. The legislator should also ?let the laws be known? (Bentham 42). If the people do not know a law, it cannot effect expectation. A law inevitably to be pull ahead rough what it is and it must be slowly tacit what the law is trying to do. Bentham?s third condition is that ?the laws should be consistent with themselves? (Bentham 43). Because it stems from reason, all law should fit together. Bentham goes on to state ?it is only possible to make laws truly consistent, by following the principles of utility? (Bentham 44). There also should be ? system in the laws?, meaning ?both the style and line of battle ought to be simple. The law should be a manual of affirmation for every individual, and he ought to be able to consult it, under all his doubts, without requiring an interpreter.? Another necessary condition is that ?the law should be inaugurate to the mind as about to be kill? (Bentham 44). The final condition for controlling expectati on is, ?that the laws should be literally unders tood! ? (Bentham 46). Bentham asserts that, ?good laws are those for which good reasons are assignable.? He goes on to say that ?a comparative balance for and against [a good law] is plummy? (Bentham 6). Bentham believes that laws should include a announcement of reasons. Explaining the reasons would allow the law to be to a greater extent easy understood. In promulgating the reason of the law, there is no skepticism as to the real aspiration of the legislator. ?The reasons themselves would serve as a kind of flow in cases in which the law was unknown? (Bentham 9). Bentham argues that exhibiting the reasons for a law would leave only one interpretation. Thus, judges would not make stupid interpretations, ?unintentional errors would become almost impossible?, and ?the citizens would judge the judges? (Bentham 10).
According to Bentham, the main goal of the law is ?the preventing of individuals from pursuing their own happiness, by the close of a greater portion of the happiness of others? (Bentham 13). Therefore, the legislator must demonstrate that a law is conformable to the principal of utility; in order to do so, a reason must be given to every law. Bentham and Hobbes have different theories of legislation. Thus, they would view philander findings in different ways. According to Hobbes? theory of legislation, the law is the intention of the legislator. In regards to Marbury v. Madison I see Hobbes would react to the concomitant that the judiciary is the one making law. jurist marshall verbalise in his opinion that ?it is emphatically the country and duty of the discriminatory depart ment to say what the law is?. Hobbes would dis reserv! e with this statement. It is the job of the legislative body to say what law is. In this case, marshall is making law by establishing the principal of discriminative review. Judicial Review is ?the power of the Court not only to interpret the constitutionality of a law or statute but also to carry out the process and enforce its decision? (Wikipedia.com). Hobbes? theory portrays a clear role of the legislative and administrator branches; the legislature makes laws and the executive enforces the laws. The ism of judicial review goes against Hobbesian theory. Hobbes? theory also states that judges should decide cases based on equity and the evidence in each particular case. I conceive of Hobbes would view marshall?s opinion inequitable. On the other hand, Bentham believes that every decision should be based on its possible consequences. In the case of Marbury v. Madison, marshal believed that as a judge he could never take into account the consequences of his opinion when deci sion making cases. Bentham would disagree with this. According to his theory, the promulgation of reasons ?would be a compass for judges? (Bentham 9). He goes on to argue that stating the reasons for a law would enable the citizens to judge the judges (Bentham10). I venture that Bentham would praise Chief Justice marshal for commenting on the reasons behind his opinion. Marshall opined that The Judiciary turn of events of 1789, permitting the Supreme Court of the United States to roll in the hay a writ of mandamus, is unconstitutional. Marshall goes on to state the reason for his decision; the Constitution is the autocratic law of the land. Since The Judiciary Act contradicts the Constitution, it is the Constitution that is supreme. This is a very strong reason for Marshall?s decision and as Bentham states, ?the strength of the reason will become the strength of the law? (Bentham 10). Because Marshall exhibited of the strong ratiocination behind the law, the power of judicial r eview is still swelled in American society. If I had! to recommend either Hobbes? or Bentham?s theory to a legislator as a guide to how law should be made, I would recommend Bentham?s theory of Legislation. When it comes to the role of the judiciary, Hobbes? theory can be ambiguous and contradictive. Overall, his theory does not explain what merely a law is. Hobbes? theory gives absolute authority to an inexplicable sovereign. On the other hand, Bentham gives a straightforward, future-oriented theory of legislation. I agree with him that legislators drive to be blow-by-blow in every law that they frame. Bentham argues that security is the most important aspect of civil law; I agree with him. Citizens need some form of security against the government. If you were to follow Hobbes? theory of an unaccountable sovereign, there would be no security from the government. I think that legislators try too toilsome to meet citizens? expectations and according to Bentham every law does not need to meet the general expectation. Bentham?s th eory of legislation does not require an interpreter of the law. It is the interpretation of the law that gives the judiciary too much power, and essentially, the power to make laws. While Hobbes? theory of legislation is similar to Bentham?s, I do not believe that it is the top hat guide to how law should be made. There should be zipper ambiguous about law making. People deserve to know the reasons behind a law and Bentham requires that, I think more people would obey the law if they understood why is what enacted in the first place. Both Hobbes and Bentham attempted to solve the problem of interpretation; concluding that there is only one way to interpret a law. Bentham argues that promulgating the reasons for a law solves the interpretation problem. In Hobbes? theory of legislation, he claims it is the people who enforce the law that decide what it means. While they were both legal positivists, their theories differed greatly in regards to natural law. I would recommend Bentham? s theory to a legislator because it is more easily un! derstood and less ambiguous than Hobbes? theory of legislation. BibliographyBentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of morals and Legislation,The whole kit of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1, Bowring, John, ed. (Edinburgh: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1843), pp. 1-154. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan If you want to get a skillful essay, order it on our website:
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